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Affirmative Action:
A Rose By Any Other Name
KINGSLEY R. BROWNE*
Affirmative action has become an increasing focus of public-
policy discussion. Although relatively uncontroversial when it exists
in the form of "outreach" activities, affirmative action that takes the
form of preferences has always been controversial. Despite the public's
general disapproval of race and sex preferences, such preferences have
insinuated themselves into virtually all of our important institutions.
Yet, for much of its existence the issue of preferences has maintained
a relatively low profile.
How can it be that what is today viewed as such a "hot button"
issue has managed to smolder beneath the surface for so long with
so few eruptions? The answer to the question is undoubtedly complex,
but a large part of the answer seems to be that preferential programs
were relatively invisible. At least in their early years, it was primarily
bureaucracies and courts - the least politically responsible branches
of government - that sponsored such policies. ' Although Congress
has in recent years created many programs containing race and sex
preferences, they are usually small parts of large bills and attract little
attention .2
When Congress has been forced to deal with affirmative-action
issues in a highly visible way, it has been much less enthusiastic. For
* Associate Professor, Wayne State University Law School.
e 1996 Kingsley R. Browne.
1. See Kingsley R. Browne, Liberty vs. Equality: Congressional Enforcement Power
under the Fourteenth Amendment, 59 DENv. L.J. 417, 452-53 (1982); Philip B. Kurland,
Ruminations on the Quality of Equality, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 18 (1979).
2. See LAURENCE TRIaE, AMERicAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 345 (2d ed. 1988) (noting
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example, although much of the opposition to the nomination of
Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court was based upon concern over
his views on preferences,3 few questions in his confirmation hearings
touched on the subject. 4 Similarly, during the pendency of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, the practice of "race norming" came to the
public consciousness., That practice, which involves reporting of test
scores as percentile scores within racial groups, was widespread at the
time. With little publicly expressed opposition by individual congress-
men, a provision outlawing race norming was included in the Act.
Interestingly, there was very little discussion about why race norming
was any worse than many other forms of preference.
Another reason for the lack of vocal opposition to preferences
is the absence of an organized constituency to oppose them. Govern-
ment agencies, civil rights organizations, and corporate employers all
line up in support of preferences, while the primary victims are, as
Justice Scalia noted in his dissent in Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 6 "predominantly unknown, unaffluent, [and] unorganized."
As Justice Scalia noted, amicus briefs of employers filed in Johnson
uniformly supported the legality of preferences.7
The absence of an organized constituency can have a substantial
effect, as demonstrated by the course of the California Civil Rights
Initiative, which would prohibit state-sponsored preferential policies.
Although it now appears that the initiative will appear on the ballot
in November 1996,8 its future just a few months ago was not so
bright. 9 Despite widespread popular support for the initiative, it ap-
peared that its sponsors were unlikely to be able to garner enough
signatures to get the measure on the ballot. The movement became
revitalized only when the state Republican party and the Republican
National Committee took over the signature-gathering effort. 10
that the minority set-aside examined in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), was adopted
as a floor amendment "without any congressional hearings or investigation whatsoever"); Drew
S. Days, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453, 465 (1987) (noting that the Fullilove set-aside was enacted
into law without hearings or committee reports, and with only token opposition).
3. See Linda Greenhouse, Who's Judge Thomas? For Now, It Depends on Who You
Are, N.Y. TIsS, Sept. 8, 1991, § 4, at 4.
4. See W. John Moore, Like Souter, Thomas Left Few Ripples, 23 Nat'l J., 2274
(Sept. 21, 1991).
5. See Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A "Quota Bill, " a Codifi-
cation of Griggs, a Partial Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE W. REs. L.
REV. 287, 379 n.387 (1993) (collecting sources).
6. 480U.S. 616, 677 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
7. Id.8. B. Drummond Ayres. Jr.. Foes of Affirmativw A tinn Claim (',lfornia y a;9 , Spo,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1996, at A14.
9. B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Efforts to End Job Preferences Are Faltering, N.Y. TIMEs,
Nov. 20, 1995, at Al.
10. B. Drummond Ayres, Foes of Affirmative Action Are Gaining in Ballot Effort,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1996, at A14.
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Yet another reason for the lack of public debate - and perhaps
the most shameful one - is that many opponents of preferences have
been reluctant to take a stand against preferences because of a realistic
fear that they will be labeled racists for doing so. Recently, however,
the opposition to preferences has become much more visible, possibly
because a critical mass of vocal opponents, many of them minorities
and women, has developed, so that arguments that they are all
motivated by racism become implausible.
Although many blame a "white male backlash" for the current
unpopularity of preferential policies, the fact is that there has been
no recent major shift in public opinion. Instead, over the last decade
there has been consistent opposition to preferences." The slight in-
crease in opposition that has occurred has been across the board:
among males and females; whites, blacks, and hispanics; Republicans,
Democrats, and Independents. 12 In part, the growing publicly ex-
pressed disaffection with preferences may be a result of an accumu-
lating sense that what was viewed a quarter of a century ago as a
temporary measure has become a ubiquitous feature of daily life
showing no signs of abatement. 3
Whatever the reason, political opposition to preferential policies
is more visible now than it has been in the past. One measure of that
visibility is the Equal Opportunity Act of 1995,14 currently pending
in Congress. That bill, introduced by Congressman Charles Canady
in the House and Senator Robert Dole in the Senate, would prohibit
the federal government from employing preferences in its own activ-
ities and from requiring private employers to do so as well.
Very little of the opposition to the bill has consisted of a frank
defense of preferential policies. Instead, the opposition has consisted
primarily of denials that the federal government requires preferences
and denials that preferences are widespread. By relying on their own
definitions of terms such as "affirmative action," "reverse discrimi-
nation," and "quotas," opponents of the bill have largely based their
arguments upon obfuscation.
What follows is testimony submitted to the House Committee on
Economic and Educational Opportunities, Subcommittee on Em-
ployer- Employee Relations, on February 29, 1996.1 The statement
had several purposes: (1) to show how failure to agree on the meaning
of critical terms serves the disingenuous and makes productive debate
11. Jack Citrin, Affirmative Action in the People's Court, 122 PuB. INTEREST 39, 42-
45 (Winter 1996).
12. Id.
13. See generally HERMAN BEZ, EQUALITY TRANSFORMED: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1991) (describing the history of affirmative action).
14. S. 1085, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 2185, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
15. This statement is a somewhat revised version of a statement that was submitted to
the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on the Constitution, on December 7, 1995.
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impossible; (2) to explain how "goals and timetables" lead ineluctably
to preferences; (3) to comment briefly on the possible effect of the
Supreme Court's decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena6 on
the enforcement activities of the Office of Federal Contract Compli-
ance Programs (OFCCP), and; (4) to suggest how the OFCCP's
enforcement mission should be modified.
16. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
Statement of Kingsley R. Browne
Associate Professor
Wayne State University Law School
Before the House Committee on
Economic and Educational Opportunities
Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations
February 29, 1996
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
My name is Kingsley Browne. I am a law professor at Wayne State
University in Detroit, where I specialize in employment discrimination
law. Prior to joining the faculty at Wayne State, I practiced labor and
employment law in San Francisco.
I appreciate very much the opportunity to address you concerning
the Equal Opportunity Act of 1995, which is an important step toward
the race- and sex-blind world of work that many want. You have heard
much testimony concerning the policy arguments for and against certain
forms of affirmative action, and I will not focus heavily on those issues.
Instead, I would like to direct my remarks to some slightly more
technical aspects of current affirmative action programs and attempt to
refine the focus of the debate.
As I set out more fully below, it is critically important to understand
the way that numerical objectives, such as those implemented by the
OFCCP and used by the federal government in its own employment,
have shifted the focus of decision-making from the relevant criterion
of merit to the irrelevant criteria of race, sex, and ethnicity. Whether
or not that was the intention, it most assuredly has been the conse-
quence.
I. SUMMARY OF TEsTIMoNY
The central purpose of the Equal Opportunity Act of 1995 (H.R.
2128) is to prohibit the federal government from granting preferential
treatment on the basis of race, sex, or ethnicity and from requiring or
encouraging the use of such preferences by federal contractors. The bill
is a sensible, moderate, and necessary means of achieving that end,
while at the same time preserving the ability of the federal government
to engage in vigorous outreach activities in its employment and con-
tracting practices and to require the same of government contractors.
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The debate over "affirmative action" has been less productive than
it might have been, because partisans to the debate often talk past each
other rather than with each other, with one side using quite different
definitions of terms than the other side uses. Terms like "affirmative
action," "goals and timetables," "reverse discrimination," and "quo-
tas" are often used without a shared understanding of their meaning.
But substance is more important than labels, so the critical question in
considering this bill is "what kinds of actions would be permitted and
what kinds of actions would be prohibited"?
The core of H.R. 2128 is to prohibit "preferences," meaning the
conscious use of race or sex in making decisions, whether as "tie
breakers," "plus factors," or "rigid quotas." The bill embodies the
salutary principle that race- and sex-blind decisions should be the norm.
H.R. 2128 goes no farther than necessary to eliminate preferences.
By its terms, it defines as a "preference" "any use of a quota, set-
aside, numerical goal, timetable, or other numerical objective." If
preferences are to be eliminated, it is necessary to eliminate all of the
above-enumerated practices.
Some argue that while quotas and set-asides truly involve prefer-
ences, goals and timetables do not; instead, they merely establish realistic
targets for the employer's work force and require only good-faith efforts
at satisfaction. This is an unrealistic view of the real-world effects of
goals and timetables.
Numerical goals necessarily impose pressure to be race- and sex-
conscious. The notion that one can simultaneously attempt to satisfy a
numerical goal and maintain a race- and sex-blind selection process is
an illusion. In the cases that matter, when the time comes, the decision-
maker will be guided either by qualifications or by race or sex. If both
criteria point in the same direction, the goal has no effect; qualifications
are sufficient. Instead, goals have an impact primarily in those circum-
stances where qualifications indicate one course of action and the goals
indicate another. Which is to control? This bill would eliminate that
dilemma.
Others argue that "mere preferences" should be permissible, but
that "rigid quotas" should not be. However, the dichotomy between
preferences and quotas is illusory. First, the meaning of the term
"quota" is often so rigid - involving hiring of persons without regard
to whether they are even minimally qualified - that to disclaim quotas
is to disclaim something that never happens. Second, the effects of
preferences on both the favored group and the disfavored group are
largely indistinguishable from the effects of quotas: both quotas and
preferences stigmatize the favored group by implying that its members
could not compete against others on an equal footing, and both quotas
1130
A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME
and preferences exclude members of the disfavored group from oppor-
tunities on the basis of race or sex.
Properly understood, the current scheme of OFCCP enforcement
contravenes the spirit, if not the letter, of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,' by requiring contrac-
tors to engage in race- and sex-conscious hiring. Whether or not the
OFCCP system is constitutional, however, it is poor policy. A legislative
solution to a problem does not depend on its being of constitutional
magnitude.
In recent years, the OFCCP seems to have largely redefined its
mission. It has become an antidiscrimination enforcement agency whose
functions largely duplicate those of the EEOC. Consequently, its en-
forcement of the discrimination laws should be transferred to the EEOC,
and the OFCCP should concentrate on assisting employers in their
outreach activities.
Anyone who opposes preferences should favor this bill. Its mod-
erate approach would eliminate government-sponsored preferences but
at the same time leave the Federal Government free to engage in (and
require) efforts to increase the diversity of the applicant pool, as well
as leaving private contractors free - within the limits of current law
- to engage in preferential policies.
II. How SHOULD THE RELEVANT TERMS BE DEFINED?
One of the most difficult problems impeding productive discussion
of affirmative action is that - whether through inadvertence or design
- parties to the debate often use the same words to mean different
things. The terms "quotas," "goals and timetables," "affirmative ac-
tion," "reverse discrimination," and "preferences" seem to mean dif-
ferent things to different people. These labels and their sometimes
shifting meanings should not be allowed to obscure the fact that what
is important at bottom is what kind of behaviors are required or
encouraged by current law and what kinds of behaviors are forbidden
or discouraged. 2
In order to situate the discussion, it would be instructive to define
some of the terms that are commonly used in this debate.
1. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
2. Because the area of my primary specialization is employment, most of my specific
observations are directed toward the employment implications of H.R. 2128. However, the
principles that I discuss are fully transferrable to other areas, such as preferences in contracting.
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A. Quotas: The term "quota" is often defined by proponents of
strong forms of affirmative action as something like:
a fixed number or percentage of persons of a particular race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin which must be attained, or which
cannot be exceeded, regardless of whether such persons meet necessary
qualifications for the job.
Everyone is against quotas when defined this way, but that is largely
academic, since even the most aggressive affirmative-action program
does not require the hiring of the utterly unqualified.'
However, there is a less extreme kind of plan that many would
label as a "quota," though it does not fall within the above definition.
In the seminal case of United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,3 for
example, the Supreme Court upheld a training program in which 50%
of the slots were reserved for minorities.4 Brian Weber sued because he
was denied entry into the program. He had been excluded from con-
sideration for half the slots in the training program, slots that were
filled by minorities having less seniority than he had. The minorities
who were selected for the training program did not lack the minimum
qualifications for the program; they simply had less seniority than Weber
and other whites and did not have to compete against whites for those
slots. I would venture to say that most laymen would view this as a
"quota" - a racial entitlement to not less than 50% of the training-
program slots - but the narrow definition of the term described above
allows proponents of such plans to deny that quotas are involved.
B. Outreach: One form of affirmative action that just about
everyone endorses is "outreach": attempts by the employer to "cast a
wider net" to increase the diversity of the applicant pool. Outreach
efforts may take the form of advertising in publications having a high
female or minority readership, participation in job fairs, or other
practices to encourage applicants who would not be reached by more
traditional methods. Outreach efforts by themselves do not involve
"preferences," since after obtaining the broader pool, the employer
may make its selection in a race- and sex-blind fashion.
C. Preferences: The term "preferences" is at the heart of the
proposed legislation, because the operative provision prohibits the fed-
eral government from "grant[ing] a preference," which is defined to
mean "use of any preferential treatment and includes but is not limited
3. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
4. Although the current bill would not amend Title VII or alter the scope of permissible
affirmative-action programs. the facts of Title VII and Equal Protection cases are used for
illustrative purposes, because that is the context in which affirmative-action programs typically
come to the attention of the legal system.
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to any use of a quota, set-aside, numerical goal, timetable, or other
numerical objective."
I believe that what is meant by the words "preference" and
"preferential treatment" (and what most laymen would take these terms
to mean) is race- or sex- conscious selection decisions that deviate from
the employer's ordinary merit-based, or at least race- and sex-neutral,
selection criteria. The preference may or may not take the form of a
"quota." There are two conceptually related forms of preferences: "tie
breakers" and "plus factors."
1. Use of Race or Sex as a "Tie Breaker": This is a form of
preference in which the employer uses sex or race after its traditional
merit-based selection procedures have produced multiple candidates who
are equally qualified. This may be a common or uncommon form of
preference, depending upon how closely the employer scrutinizes qual-
ifications. In circumstances in which the employer carefully examines
the background, skills, abilities, and experience of candidates, it is
relatively uncommon for candidates to be judged exactly equal. On the
other hand, if the employer merely looks for minimum qualifications
and treats all applicants having the minimum qualifications as equal,
then tie breakers would be frequently used. Ordinarily, employers do
not use the latter form of selection, preferring instead to find "the most
qualified candidate" rather than "a qualified candidate." However, if
preferences are permitted to break ties, an employer that wishes to
employ preferences may declare candidates equally qualified to take
advantage of its ability to use race or sex as a tie breaker.
An example of the use of sex as a tie breaker is found in the case
of United States v. Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway.'
In that case, the school district had to lay off a teacher in the high
school's business department. There were two teachers - one white
and one black - who were deemed equally qualified and who had
equal seniority. The school district's normal practice in such circum-
stances would be to flip a coin to decide which teacher would be laid
off. However, the school district - which had not engaged in prior
discrimination and which already had a higher percentage of black
teachers than the availability in the local market - selected the white
teacher, Sharon Taxman, for layoff based upon a "diversity" rationale.
The Clinton administration supports the school district's right to lay
Ms. Taxman off because she is white. 6
5. 832 F. Supp. 836 (D.N.J. 1993).
6. The lawsuit was initially pursued on Ms. Taxman's behalf by the Justice Department,
with Ms. Taxman being a plaintiff-intervenor. After the Justice Department prevailed at trial,
the Department sought to switch sides and support the racial preference. The Third Circuit
recently rejected its efforts to do so, and in effect ordered the Justice Department out of the
case. United States v. Board of Educ. of the Township of Piscataway, 69 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 448 (3d Cir. 1995).
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2. Use of Race or Sex as a "Plus Factor": This is a broad category
of preference that also includes use of race or sex as a tie breaker.
When race or sex is used as a tie breaker, it has only enough weight
to tip scales that are in equipoise. However, race or sex may be
given more weight than that. The challenged action in Johnson v.
Transportation Agency7 would fall within this definition. In Johnson,
the employer passed over a male candidate for promotion in favor of
a somewhat less qualified female. Although the employer stated that
the decision was based upon a combination of qualifications and "af-
firmative action matters," the district court found that sex was the
determining factor in the decision. Thus, here is a case in which the
person selected was clearly qualified for the job but nevertheless received
the job only because sex was a "plus factor" in the decision.
In Johnson, sex was given only a relatively small amount of weight,
since the woman selected was rated as almost as qualified as the man
rejected. In other cases, the employer may give it even more weight,
.resulting in the selection of employees who are substantially less qual-
ified, but still at least "minimally qualified." The Supreme Court in
Johnson did not limit its approval of preferences to circumstances in
which the candidates are equal or almost equal in qualifications.
D. Goals and Timetables: The OFCCP requires federal contrac-
tors to establish "goals and timetables" for remedying "underutiliza-
tion" of women and minorities.8 The level of the goals should be "the
results which could reasonably be expected from [the contractor's]
putting forth every good faith effort to make its overall affirmative
action program work." 9 The regulations further provide that these goals
should not be "rigid and inflexible quotas which must be met." 10
Goals do not necessarily and by definition involve "preferences,"
as defined above. However, affirmative action programs may "in design
and execution . . . be race, color, sex, or ethnic 'conscious.""' It thus
appears that the enforcement agencies do not themselves have a pref-
erence for preferences; they will be perfectly satisfied if the goals can
be satisfied without preferences. For those who favor selection based
upon merit, rather than status, the concern with goals is not that they
by definition embody preferences, but that in operation they almost
inevitably do. That is why it is critically important that goals and
timetables be included within the prohibited practices under this bill. I
will address this issue in Section IV, below.
7. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
8. 41 C.F.R. 60-60.2(b) (1995).
9. 41 C.F.R. 60-2.i2(a) (995).
10. 41 C.F.R. 60-2.12(e) (1995).
11. 41 C.F.R. 60-3.17(3) (1995).
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E. Reverse Discrimination: This term, like the term "quotas" is
largely a label applied to policies that the speaker does not like. For
example, President Clinton declared his support for "affirmative ac-
tion" except when it turns into "reverse discrimination.' ' 2 The term
"reverse discrimination" can be used in two ways. In its narrow sense,
it refers to "preferences" - as defined above - that are illegal. It is
this sense of the term that Professor Alfred Blumrosen used in the
report on reverse discrimination that he prepared for the Department
of Labor. 3 He concluded that reverse discrimination is rare based upon
his finding that few discrimination charges are filed by white men
complaining that they have been victimized by affirmative action and
that lawsuits brought by such plaintiffs are generally found to lack legal
merit.' 4 From this, he concluded that "reverse discrimination" is not a
problem.
Others (including, I would venture to guess, most laymen) use a
far less restricted definition of reverse discrimination. Under the broader
view, "reverse discrimination" would be largely congruent with "pre-
ferences," as defined above: denying an employment opportunity to a
person because of race or sex in order to advantage a member of an
historically disfavored group. The "reverse" in reverse discrimination
refers not to illegality but simply to the fact that the victim is a white
or a man, instead of a minority or a woman. Thus, when a white
woman is denied a job because she is white, that is reverse discrimi-
nation; when she is denied a job because she is a woman, that is
"garden- variety" discrimination.
Whether "reverse discrimination" is rare or common depends upon
which of the above definitions is adopted. Both Weber and Johnson
involved reverse discrimination under the broader definition, a form of
discrimination that is quite common. On the other hand, Professor
12. In his statement on affirmative action, President Clinton stated that he was in favor
of "affirmative action," but that he did not favor "the unjustified preference of the unqualified
over the qualified," "numerical quotas," or "rejection or selection of any employee ... solely
on the basis of race or gender without regard to merit." Todd S. Purdum, President Shows
Fervent Support for Goals of Affirmative Action, N.Y. TrmEs, July 20, 1995, at A-I.
13. Alfred W. Blumrosen, Draft Report on Reverse Discrimination Published by Labor
Dep't: How the Courts Are Handling Reverse Discrimination Claims, reprinted in DAIY LAB.
REP. (BNA) No. 147 (Aug. 1, 1995), available in LEXIS, Labor Library, DLABRT file, Doc.
No. 1995 DLR 147 d43.
14. The conclusion that there are few meritorious claims seems somewhat inconsistent
with the data contained in the report. Of 21 cases involving individual claims of discrimination,
Blumrosen reported that the plaintiff prevailed in 6 (or 28%). Of cases challenging affirmative-
action programs, 12 cases upheld them, while 6 invalidated or modified the plans, and in an
additional 2 cases, the courts ruled that the programs had met their goals and should be
dissolved. Thus, in 40% of these cases, the affirmative action plans were in one way or another
found to be unjustified. The logic of the Blumrosen report would suggest that a finding that
plaintiffs prevail in only 1/3 of reported Title VII cases would justify repeal of the statute.
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Blumrosen concluded that reverse discrimination is rare, because his
definition focused on illegality.' 5 His report, and much of the use that
has been made of it, is extremely disingenuous. Despite the rhetorical
use of his study, it was not the rarity of victims of preferences that led
to his conclusion. Instead, what led to his conclusion was the general
legality of preferences in the private sector under the Supreme Court's
permissive standards in Weber and Johnson. Successful lawsuits alleging
reverse discrimination are rare because race and sex preferences that
disadvantage white men are usually not illegal in the private sector, just
as prior to 1965 successful lawsuits alleging racial discrimination were
rare, not because racial discrimination was rare, but because it was not
illegal.
Despite the laxity of the standards set forth in Weber and Johnson,
there is substantial question whether some affirmative action plans under
the Executive Order are valid. In both Weber and Johnson, the Court
held that preferences were permissible to remedy "manifest imbalances"
in "traditionally segregated job categories." However, affirmative action
plans are required under the Executive Order to remedy "underutili-
zation" in any job category, "underutilization" being defined as "hav-
ing fewer minorities or women in a particular job group than would
reasonably be expected by their availability.' ' 6 It is not clear that
"underutilization" is as strict a standard as "manifest imbalance."
More significantly, under the Executive Order, underutilization must be
remedied in all job categories, not just in "traditionally segregated"
ones. Moreover, underutilization must be remedied as to all racial
groups, not just ones that have been historically subjected to discrimi-
nation in the particular industry.
In Johnson, Justice Brennan emphasized that the "traditionally
segregated job category" requirement is intended to have meaning:
The requirement that the "manifest imbalance" relate to a "tradition-
ally segregated job category" provides assurance... that race and sex
will be taken into account in a manner consistent with Title VII's
purpose of eliminating the effects of employment discrimination .... 17
Thus, Johnson suggests that employers who attempt to "remedy"
"underutilization" without regard to whether the job category is a
15. Most of the cases in which reverse-discrimination plaintiffs prevailed were brought
against governmental employers, which are governed by the stricter constitutional standards.
16. 41 C.F.R. 60-2.11(b) (1995).
17. 480 U.S. at 632. See also United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,
212 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that a job category is '"traditionally segregated'
when there has been a societal history of purposeful exclusion of blacks from the job category,
resulting in a persistent disparity between the proportion of blacks in the labor force and the
proportion of blacks among those who hold jobs within the category").
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traditionally segregated one, violate Title VII by doing so. Yet this kind
of activity is encouraged by the OFCCP rather than prohibited.
F. Affirmative Action: Perhaps the most meaningless phrase in
this entire discussion is "affirmative action." Affirmative action can be
racial quotas or outreach activities or anything in between. The amor-
phousness of the phrase has contributed a great deal to the misunder-
standing (or obfuscation) of this debate. As a case in point, pollster
Louis Harris has criticized Republicans for attempting to cause the
American people to equate affirmative action (which most Americans
favor) and preferential treatment (which most Americans oppose). 8
Harris presented a sample with the following language from the Cali-
fornia Civil Rights Initiative:
The state will not use race, sex, color, ethnicity or national origin as
a criterion for either discriminating against, or granting preferential
treatment to, any individual or group in the operation of the state's
system of public employment, education, or public contracting.
Harris reported that about 80 percent of respondents favored the prop-
osition as worded. He then asked respondents if they would vote for
the proposition "if it outlawed all affirmative action programs for
women and minority groups." He reports that support for the initiative
plummeted and that many people interviewed were angry after being
told that the California Civil Rights Initiative would end all affirmative
action. They felt that they had been duped.
Before Harris told respondents that the Initiative would outlaw all
affirmative action, he asked respondents what "affirmative action"
meant. Sixty-eight percent of whites said it referred to "programs
intended to help women and members of minority groups who had not
had equal opportunities in education and employment."
It is hardly surprising that the respondents felt duped. They were
shown language that would outlaw discrimination and preferential treat-
ment, and they were then told that the initiative would "really" eliminate
all "programs intended to help women and members of minority groups."
The respondents were indeed duped, but it was Harris, not the sponsors
of the initiative, who duped them.
Public support for affirmative action seems to be limited to kinds
of affirmative action that do not amount to preferences. Polls that ask
whether respondents support affirmative action or whether they favor
measures to aid women and minorities generally show high levels of
support (a result that calls into question the frequent assertion that our
society is pervaded with sexism and racism). However, when respondents
18. Louis Harris, Affirmative Action and the Voter, N.Y. TIMEs, July 31, 1995, at A13.
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are asked more specific questions, which go to the issue of exactly what
kinds of affirmative action they favor, polls consistently show that they
do not think that employers should take race or sex into account in
making individual employment decisions. For example, a 1991 New
York Times/CBS News poll asked respondents, "Do you believe that
where there has been job discrimination against blacks in the past,
preference in hiring or promotion should be given to blacks today?"
Sixty-one percent of respondents answered "no," while only 24% said
"yes." 9 A Washington Post/ABC News poll produced similar results,
with 80% of all respondents opposed to racial preferences in jobs even
when "there are no rigid quotas." 2 A recent Los Angeles Times poll
found that although a majority favored "affirmative action" for women
and minorities, only 22% believed that "qualified minorities should
receive preference over equally qualified whites" and only 25%7o believed
that "qualified women should receive preference over equally qualified
men. "  Thus by about a 3:1 margin, Americans oppose the most
moderate form of preference - the tie breaker. Only slightly fewer
Americans (21076) favor affirmative action that uses quotas, suggesting
that the American people are not convinced that there is much difference
between "preferences" and "quotas."
III. THE Focus SHOULD BE ON WHAT BEHAVIORS ARE INVOLVED,
NOT THE LABEL THAT IS PLACED ON THEM.
Because of the shifting definitions of relevant terms, debate should
focus more clearly on what behaviors are permissible rather than on
what labels are used. For ease of discussion, I will use the term
"affirmative action" to include all conscious efforts made by an em-
ployer to increase the racial, ethnic, or sexual diversity of its applicant
pool or work force, whether or not the means chosen involve "prefer-
ences" and whether or not they are legal. Using this definition, virtually
all parties agree that some affirmative action should be permitted and
some should be forbidden.
The real question here is what kinds of behaviors are the federal
government as employer and the OFCCP as enforcer permitted to
19. Robin Toner, Symbolic Justice; Capturing an Era's Racial Conflicts and Ironies,
N.Y. TMEs, July 7, 1991, § 4, at 1.
20. Tom Kenworthy & Thomas B. Edsall, Whites See Jobs on Line in Debate; Some
,",LtU ....... .Cfl ... veOC A ltza, T . - .. I s, at Afl.
21. Cathleen Decker, The Times Poll: Most Back Anti-Bias Policy but Spurn Racial
Preferences, L.A. TIuds, Mar. 30, 1995, at Al.
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engage in or encourage. Since all agree that strict quotas are bad, and
all agree that outreach activities are good, the critical ground lies in the
middle. The central issue is whether the federal government in its
employment, contracting, and regulatory practices is permitted to engage
in or encourage race- and sex-conscious preferences, whether in the
nature of "'plus factors, " as in Johnson, or racial set-asides, as in
Weber.
Some believe that the federal government should not - and private
employers should not be forced or encouraged to - grant preferences
on the basis of race or sex. Nonetheless, they believe that employers
should be encouraged to attempt to increase their workforce diversity
through non-preferential means. H.R. 2128 is a balanced attempt to
respond to both of those policy preferences, because it prohibits quotas
and set-asides while at the same time preserving outreach activities.
However, the question remains whether this bill goes beyond discour-
aging preferences by its elimination of goals and timetables and other
numerical objectives. For reasons set forth below, I do not believe that
it is possible to retain goals and timetables and eliminate preferences.
Therefore, one who is opposed to preferences should also oppose goals
and timetables.
On the other hand, others believe that preferences that do not
involve quotas should be permissible, even though quotas should not
be. This raises the question whether there is a principled distinction
between the two. As set forth below, they both raise largely the same
issues, so a principled stand against quotas leads to a rejection of
preferences as well.
IV. GoALs AND PREFERENCES
A. If "goals and timetables" do not necessarily and by
definition involve "'preferences, " why should someone who
opposes preferences oppose goals and timetables?
Put another way, why do goals and timetables lead almost
inevitably to "preferences"?
The OFCCP maintains that preferences are radically different phe-
nomena from goals and timetables. In a July 26, 1995, statement,
Shirley Wilcher, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Contract Compliance,
explained: "Unlike preferences and quotas, numerical goals recognize
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that persons are to be judged on individual ability, and are, therefore,
consistent with the principles of merit hiring and promotion.'' 22 Ac-
cording to this statement, in order to achieve its goals, an employer "is
never required to . . . hire a less qualified person in preference to a
more qualified person." Furthermore, "[a] contractor's compliance is
measured by whether it has made good faith efforts to meet its goals"
and "[flailure to meet goals is not a violation of the Executive Order."
According to Secretary of Labor Robert Reich, the purpose of most
affirmative action laws is simply to get employers to "cast a wider net"
to find qualified applicants.'
In one sense - but a trivial one - it is true that neither the
Executive Order nor the OFCCP formally imposes a requirement that
employers engage in preferential hiring. Rather, employers are to
establish goals and devote their utmost effort to achieving them. How
they achieve these goals is up to them. The OFCCP would presumably
be just as happy if the employer could achieve its goals through race-
and sex-blind hiring.
But what about those many circumstances where the employer
cannot achieve its goals without giving preference to women or mi-
norities? The formal position of the OFCCP is that failure to satisfy
goals is not by itself a violation of the regulations and that as long
as the employer is making good-faith efforts to achieve the goals, the
employer is in compliance.
But what about the reality? What are the practical consequences
of failure to achieve numerical goals? In order to understand those
consequences, one must compare the situation of an employer that
satisfies its goals and one that does not.
In determining whether and how extensively to conduct a com-
pliance review of a contractor, the OFCCP examines the extent to
which the contractor is achieving its goals. Contractors with "good
numbers" are often given a relatively cursory examination if they are
reviewed at all. 24 However, contractors that are not making fast
enough progress toward their goals are given a much more extensive
22. Memorandum from Shirley J. Wilcher, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Federal
Contract Compliance, Dep't of Labor, to Compliance Officers (July 26, 1995), reprinted in
OFCCP Notice Reaffirming Affirmative Action Goals in Light of Adarand Decision, Admin-
istration Review, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 155 (Aug. 11, 1995), available in LEXIS, Labor
Library, DLABRT file, Doc. No. 1995 DLR 155 d22.
23. After 10 Years, Debate Resurfaces Over Merits of Affirmative Action, DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) No. 147 (Aug. 1, 1995), available in LEXIS, Labor Library, DLABRT file, Doc.
No. 1995 DLR 147 d26.24. See GENFRAT ACCT OpeicE, RiD P.fr N A . /T-IZO1 7 EUAL EML.....M....
OPPORTUNITY: DOL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE REVIEWS COULD BETTER TARGET FEDERAL CON-
TRACTORS (1995) (letter report).
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review, a review that can last months or years. 25 Because failure to
satisfy goals is taken to be evidence of discrimination, much of the
compliance review involves requiring the employer to justify its hiring,
promotion, and compensation of white men, with the agency in many
cases substituting its own judgments of qualifications for the em-
ployer's. The pressure is enhanced by the fact that the OFCCP
measures its own success by how many "victims" of discrimination
it finds and how much money it recovers for them. 26 Not surprisingly,
the OFCCP usually "finds" discrimination in its compliance reviews. 27
How does an employer avoid a lengthy compliance review, the
imposition of sanctions by the OFCCP, and the attendant bad pub-
licity? By achieving its affirmative action goals, since failure to meet
goals is taken as evidence that the employer's efforts were not in
good faith. 28
The de facto pressure to satisfy numerical goals is analogous to
the following hypothetical IRS enforcement strategy. Suppose the IRS
had an enforcement policy under which anyone who claimed deduc-
tions that brought his tax below a particular percentage (X) of his
gross income would be subjected to a thorough and time-consuming
"lifestyle" audit, similar to the kind of audit that the Service was
recently contemplating. 29 It would require the taxpayer to justify every
jot and title on his return, producing marriage licenses, property
25. Id. Approximately 84% of establishments selected for review come from a ranked
list of "flagged" contractors. These contractors are identified on the basis of their "average
utilization rate" of minorities and women. Id.
26. See OFCCP Obtained Record Settlements in Fiscal Year 1994, Wilcher Says, DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 212 (Nov. 4, 1994), available in LEXIS, Labor Library, DLABRT file,
Doc. No. 1994 DLR 212 d6. Of course, when the numbers are down, then one should not look
"strictly at the numbers" in evaluating the OFCCP's accomplishments. See OFCCP: Wilcher
Deems 1995 a Success; Expects Major Changes in 1996, DALY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 13 (Jan.
22, 1996), available in LEXIS, Labor Library, DLABRT file, Doc. No. 1996 DLR 13 d19.
27. See GAO REPORT, supra note 24 (noting that the OFCCP found "violations" in
74% of its compliance reviews in 1994, with a substantial majority of those violations being
"major" ones).
28. In other contexts, the pressure may come from elsewhere. For example, even in the
absence of external enforcement, if an employer sets goals and then ties managers' compensation
to how well the manager furthers the company's affirmative-action goals, as the Glass Ceiling
Commission has recommended, the same pressure for the manager to engage in race- or sex-
conscious decisions would exist, even if the formal policy of the employer was to make decisions
purely on the basis of merit.
29. See David Day Johnston, IRS Retreats; The Tax Audit from Hell is Sent Packing,
N.Y. Timds, Oct. 29, 1995, §4, at 2 (describing the Service's reversal of its plan to engage in
detailed random audits); Alex Pham, Auditing Lifestyles of not so Rich or Famous; IRS
Randomly Targeting 4,000 in Mass., BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 15, 1995, at 1 (describing audit under
which randomly selected taxpayers will be "asked about their hobbies, their cultural back-
grounds, the types of cars they drive, where they went on vacation, the neighborhoods they
live in and a whole host of other personal information right down to the type of furniture they
own").
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deeds, etc. Any deduction that could not be supported with extensive
documentation would be disallowed and the government would rou-
tinely assess interest and penalties in these cases. Although under the
code, paying at below the targeted percentage is completely legal, the
IRS justifies its policy on the ground that anyone who has that many
deductions must be cheating.
Now, one could say that the government in the above scenario
does not sanction taxpayers for paying less than X% of their gross
income in taxes; instead, it sanctions them only for claiming deduc-
tions that they cannot support. However, the predictable effect of the
enforcement policy is going to be that many taxpayers will "volun-
tarily" forego claiming deductions that would reduce their taxes below
the critical threshold. Just as the OFCCP says that it does not find
violations simply because of failure to satisfy goals, the IRS would
say that it does not impose penalties simply for paying less than X%
in taxes. Nonetheless, in both cases, the enforcement policies impose
substantial pressure for the regulated individuals to alter their behavior
to conform to the numerical expectations of government.
The entire OFCCP enforcement system is oriented toward en-
suring that employers make race- and sex-conscious decisions. Al-
though the OFCCP insists that most of what it does is ensure that
employers "cast a wide net," very little of its enforcement effort goes
into reviewing outreach and development programs.30 If the OFCCP
were truly primarily interested in the breadth of the employer's net,
that is what it would focus on in compliance reviews; instead, it
focuses on the employer's "numbers."
It is true that goals and preferences are formally different. Under
this reasoning, however, quotas and preferences are formally different
also. Just as a goal does not formally require preferences, neither
does a quota; both might be satisfied without preferences. Goals and
quotas establish the ends; preferences are often a necessary means to
achieve those ends.
B. If goals are keyed to "availability, " how can they pressure
employers to engage in preferences?
One of the arguments for why goals do not lead to preferences
is that since goals are based upon "availability," there is no pressure
30. As the regulations point out, "[a]n affirmative-action program is a set of specific
and result-oriented procedures to which a contractor commits itself to apply every good faith
effort." 41 CFR § 60-2.10 (1995). Thus, despite what some might say, the focus of the
compliance program is not on process but on results.
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to reduce standards. That is, if the goal is equal to the proportion of
qualified women and minorities in the labor pool, then there is no
reason that the employer would have to reduce its standards in order
to hire the appropriate number of women and minorities. This is the
position of the OFCCP, which has explicitly argued that satisfaction
of goals does not lead to preferences because "numerical benchmarks
are realistically established based on the availability of qualified ap-
plicants in the job market or qualified candidates in the employer's
work force."'"
That reasoning is flawed, because its factual premise is wrong.
The assumption that within the labor pool, however defined, pro-
ductivity-related traits are randomly distributed with respect to race
and sex is quite often simply not correct. As Professor Douglas
Laycock has observed, the assumption that but for discrimination the
employer's work force would mirror the composition of the labor
force from which it is hired:
is a powerful and implausible assumption: the two populations are
assumed to be substantially the same in their distribution of skills,
aptitudes, and job preferences. Two hundred and fifty years of
slavery, nearly a century of Jim Crow, and a generation of less
virulent discrimination are assumed to have had no effect: the black
and white populations are assumed to be substantially the same. All
the differential socialization of little girls that feminists justifiably
complain about is assumed to have had no effect; the male and
female populations are assumed to be substantially the same.32
The fact that productivity-related traits are not randomly distrib-
uted underlies the business-necessity defense under the disparate-
impact theory. If these traits were randomly distributed, valid em-
ployment requirements would never have a disparate impact other
than a random one; therefore, a disparate impact by itself would be
evidence that the requirement was not valid. Instead, however, em-
ployment requirements with a disparate impact are often valid."
Availability statistics are not an accurate measure of job quali-
fications. They are generally computed based upon broad occupational
categories, and they reflect at best only minimum qualifications for
the job and more commonly merely aggregations of jobs that have
31. See Memorandum of Shirley J. Wilcher, supra note 22.
32. Douglas A. Laycock, Statistical Proof and Theories of Discrimination, 49 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 97 (Autumn 1986).
' 33. That was the basis for the turmoil over "race norming" of scores on the General
Aptitude Test Battery (GATB) that resulted in the outlawing of that practice in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(l) (1994). The GATB yielded gross racial disparities,
yet, according to a National Academy of Sciences study, is a valid predictor of job performance.
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some superficial similarity but that are in fact quite different. They
in no sense reflect a homogeneous pool of equally qualified (or equally
interested) persons 4
It should be noted that if productivity-related traits were ran-
domly distributed with respect to race within the available pool, goals
and timetables would not increase the representation of underrepre-
sented groups in the occupational category. Instead, they would only
reshuffle them among employers. It is the fact that minorities, and
to a lesser extent women, have less of these traits than white men
that goals and timetables have the effect of drawing women and
minorities up to higher levels of employment than they would achieve
without race- and sex-conscious hiring. One who truly believes that
qualifications are equal within the pool should oppose goals and
timetables as unnecessary and insist on a simple policy of nondiscrim-
ination.
It might be instructive to consider an example of the effect of
lack of homogeneity of the applicant pool. To take an easy example,
assume that a corporation is seeking to hire a number of recent law
graduates for its legal department, and it wants to hire the best
possible candidates. On what basis is availability of minorities cal-
culated? It would probably be based upon either the proportion of
recent law graduates who are minorities or the proportion of practicing
lawyers who are minorities. Assume, for purposes of discussion, that
availability is calculated based upon recent law graduates, which would
yield a higher availability figure than the pool of practicing lawyers
because increasing numbers of minorities are attending law school.
Assume also that market conditions are such that the employer can
be quite selective in its hiring decisions.
What will be the effect of race-blind selection? In selecting among
applicants, the employer would generally place a very high emphasis
on academic record, including both the reputation of the law school
and the grades of the applicant. Keying the goal to the availability
figures assumes that the racial composition of the top group of
34. See, e.g., Catlett v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 828 F.2d 1260 (8th Cir.
1987) [sic], cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1021 (1988). In Catlett, which involved allegations of a
pattern-or-practice of sex discrimination in hiring of highway maintenance workers, the court
used two alternative availability pools: (1) "that group of persons . . . who are in the civilian
labor force ... in the job categories of sales, blue collar, farm, service and clerical, but
excluding managerial, technical and professional workers, and who are between the ages of
eighteen and seventy years and who have a driver's license and an eighth-grade education"; or
(2) "that group of persons . . . who are in the civilian labor force . . . in all job categories
Pyetmngra --- - - f-- -I A.,;- -- t-- -A ... t- ,~'S~ U_.-__ a+U
of eighteen and seventy years and who have a driver's license and an eighth-grade education."
There is no sense in which members of these highly disparate groups would likely be the same
in either qualifications or interest.
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students is the same as the racial composition of the remainder of
the pool - that is, that qualifications within the entire pool of recent
law graduates are randomly distributed with respect to race. This
would clearly be an incorrect assumption. Instead, it is quite predict-
able, as described below, that the top portion of the pool would be
disproportionately white. Therefore, race-blind selection - that is,
selection based purely on measures that predict productivity and
without regard to race - will produce a group of hires that does not
have as many minorities as the goal would call for.
Why will the top portion of the pool be disproportionately white?
Because educational achievements of blacks and whites are not equal,
as Secretary William Coleman pointed out in his testimony before the
Subcommittee on the Constitution in October. Secretary Coleman
acknowledged that, without race consciousness, parity in outcomes
will not occur anytime soon:
It would take the skill of one who could reproduce Beethoven's
Ninth Symphony on the head of a pin to devise a system which
would eliminate the effects of centuries of racial and gender discrim-
ination without taking race and sex into account in the process.35
While people of good will can - and should - debate whether race-
conscious programs are good policy, there is simply no room for
argument that in the absence of race- conscious policies all non-
discriminating employers would achieve goals based upon "availabi-
lity." This fact demonstrates the error of two related assumptions:
(1) that tying goals to availability eliminates pressure to engage in
preferences; and (2) that failure to satisfy goals is suggestive of dis-
crimination.
Educational achievements of white and minority applicants for
our hypothetical corporate law position are likely not to be equal.
One primary reason is that because of affirmative-action in law school
admissions, minority law students must compete against students
whose educational background is stronger than their own. At the
University of Texas, for example, the Law School set targets for
black (5%) and Mexican-American (10014) students in the entering
class that were consistent with the percentages of black and Mexican-
American college graduates. 36 This percentage was considered the
"availability pool."
35. See Abolishing Government Race or Gender Preferences: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995) (statement of William T. Coleman, Jr.), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, CNGTST
file.
36. See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 571, 574 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 78
F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
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If, within the pool of college graduates, credentials were randomly
distributed with respect to race and ethnicity, there would have been
no need for Texas to set a target. Instead, mere nondiscrimination
would have been sufficient, since race-blind admissions would yield
an appropriately diverse student body. However, credentials are not
randomly distributed. In fact, had the Law School decided solely on
the basis of Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) score and grade-
point average (GPA), the entering class would have included, at most,
9 blacks and 18 Mexican-Americans; instead, 41 blacks and 55 Mex-
ican-Americans were admitted.17 Since LSAT scores and GPAs do in
fact predict law school performance - that is, after all, the reason
that law schools use them38 - it is predictable that minority law
students admitted under affirmative action programs will not perform
as well as students admitted solely on the basis of their credentials.
Indeed, that seems to be the experience of many law schools.
In sum, our corporate employer has a choice when making hiring
decisions. It can hire in a race-blind fashion, in which case it will not
meet its goals. Or it can deviate from its merit-based system by using
race-conscious selection criteria and meet its goals. It cannot simul-
taneously be race blind and satisfy its goals.
C. Is there any way of separating goals and preferences? Can
we retain goals but disapprove preferences?
One response to the entwining of goals and preferences is to
make clear that goals are not to lead to preferences. That is, employers
could be told that they should attempt to satisfy their goals but that
they are not permitted to employ preferences to achieve them. In fact,
this seems to be what the OFCCP implies is their policy. For example,
in its July 26, 1995, memorandum, the OFCCP stated that "[tihe
numerical goals component of affirmative action programs is not
designed to be, nor may it properly or lawfully be interpreted as,
permitting unlawful preferential treatment and quotas" 9 and that its
37. Although in discussions of the Hopwood case it is often asserted that without
affirmative action those extra minority students would not have been able to go to law school,
that is probably not the case. The University of Texas is one of the nation's premier law
schools. Even though many of the minority students would not have gotten into texas if
admissions decisions were race blind, they probably would have gotten into a lower-tier law
school on the strength of their objective qualifications.
38. The court in Hopwood noted that use of LSAT and GPA had not been specifically
validted fnr hiblk t r1PntQ nt the Teync Law cthnI- hnw ver thev sre genprlly vnlid
predictors of academic success.
39. Emphasis added.
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regulations "specifically prohibit discrimination and the use of goals
as quotas." The OFCCP states that it will take "quick action"
"whenever evidence is revealed to OFCCP that a contractor has
implemented a quota or unlawful preference . . . in the same manner
as if the contractor has violated the Executive Order in a different
way.,,9o
The word "unlawful" is the critical term. Under Weber and
Johnson, many preferences are legal, at least in the private sector.
Thus, although the general thrust of the statement is to deny the
existence of preferences, in reality it merely denies the imposition of
illegal ones. Moreover, it should be noted that the statement of the
OFCCP says that it will take action against illegal preferences and
quotas "whenever evidence is revealed to" it; it does not say that it
affirmatively looks for such evidence. In fact, while the OFCCP
commonly requires employers to justify the hiring of white men, it
almost never requires them to justify the hiring of women or minor-
ities.
In her testimony before the Senate Labor and Human Resources
Committee, Ms. Wilcher went beyond denying that the OFCCP will
not tolerate "unlawful" preferences. Rather, she stated that "[t]he
numerical goals approach .. .is not based on racial or gender pre-
ferences" and that under OFCCP regulations, "selections for em-
ployment or promotion must be made without regard to race or
gender."' 41 With all due respect, this is simply not true. It was not
true in Weber, for example, when Kaiser set aside 50%70 of the slots
in a training program for minorities under pressure from the Office
of Federal Contract Compliance. 42 It does not seem to be the position
of the Justice Department, which supported the right of the Pisca-
taway School District to select Sharon Taxman for layoff because she
is white. It does not seem to be the position of Assistant Attorney
General Deval Patrick, who is on record as supporting race and sex-
conscious decisions - what he calls "'affirmative consideration' where
race, ethnicity, or gender is a factor, but is not necessarily dispositive
40. Emphasis added.
41. Affirmative Action and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance: Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1995) (statement
of Shirley J. Wilcher, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Federal Contract Compliance, Dep't of
Labor) (emphasis added). Although Ms. Wilcher then went on to note that this was "consistent
with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act," she did not say that selections for employment or
promotion must be made without regard to race or gender unless it would be legal under the
Civil Rights Act to grant preferences. Id.
42. See Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 226 (5th Cir. 1977)
(noting that "the district court found that the 1974 collective bargaining agreement reflected
less of a desire on Kaiser's part to train black craft workers than a self-interest in satisfying
the OFCC in order to retain lucrative government contracts").
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in evaluating qualified candidates. ,43 There is simply no evidence that
the OFCCP or any other enforcement agency ever challenges the use
of plus-factor type preferences.
In fact, employers know that the OFCCP expects them to grant
preferences and that it will not take action against them if they do.
For example, Honeywell Space Systems Group in Clearwater, Florida,
is a government contractor that was faced with the need to lay off
part of its work force." The manager of training, development, and
affirmative action described Honeywell's performance-based layoff
system as follows:
We considered first the skills we needed to do the work, the level
of performance reflected in the (individual's) personnel file, and
then length of service. So it was not a seniority- based process. It
was a performance-based process with length of service as the tie-
breaker.
However, sometimes the performance-based process did not provide
the "right" numbers. In those cases, according to the manager, "We'd
massage the numbers to make sure there wasn't a disproportionate
representation of females and minorities in the bottom of the relative
ranking." It should be noted that this is not a disgruntled manager
complaining about being forced to grant preferences. She made these
statements with pride, stating that "[w]hen you have a diverse work
force, the potential is endless."
In sum, it is not practically possible to retain "goals and timet-
ables" but jettison "preferences." Constantly keeping one eye on the
"bottom line" means that the other eye will always be on race and
sex. As long as employers are under pressure to achieve goals, pre-
ferences will be a part of the system.
V. PREFERENCES VERSUS QUOTAS
Is there a principled difference between the use of race and sex
as "plus factors" and their use as "quotas"?
Some people distinguish between using "goals" or "plus factors"
and using quotas. That seems to be what Assistant Attorney General
43. Civil Rights: Patrick Defends Affirmative Action in American Bar Association
Address, DALY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 152 (Aug. 8, 1995), available in LEXIS, Labor Library,
DLABRT file, Doc. No. 95 DLR 152 d19.
44. See Honeywell Group Keeps Commitment to Affirmative Action Plan, DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) No. 147 (Aug. 1, 1995), available in LEXIS, Labor Library, DLABRT file, Doc.
No. 1995 DLR 147 d35.
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Deval Patrick was referring to when he said that he supported using
race or sex as a factor but not one that is "necessarily dispositive in
evaluating qualified candidates."
There are two primary reasons why this dichotomy is meaningless:
(1) under the strict definition of "quota," no such animal exists in
nature; it is just a straw man; and (2) the perceived evils of quotas
are present in non-quota preferences.
As described above, quotas in the narrow sense - hiring blindly
according to the numbers and without regard to the existence of even
minimal qualifications - simply do not exist. These are the quotas
that are typically described as being illegal, but being against quotas
in this sense has as much real-world effect as being against goblins.
Quotas in the broader sense, such as the set-aside in Weber, do not
seem to be included in the usual condemnation of quotas. Thus, the
Weber preference seems to fall onto the "non-quota preference" side
of the line, even though it clearly set aside a certain number of
positions for blacks, just as the University of California had done in
its affirmative- action plan that was struck down in Bakke.45
More fundamental, however, is the issue of principle. As a matter
of principle, it is not clear why one should draw such a sharp line
between quotas and "plus-factor" preferences. As Justice Powell
noted in his opinion in Bakke, the "semantic distinction [between
'goals' and 'quotas'] is beside the point [because] the special admis-
sions program is undeniably a classification based on race and ethnic
background." 46 Judging from the poll results described above, the
American people similarly do not seem to draw much distinction
between quotas and preferences.
In thinking about whether the "quota/preference" distinction is
meaningful, one should consider carefully just why it is that racial
quotas are viewed as being wrong. Usually, two reasons are given:
one focusing on the beneficiaries of the quota and one focusing on
the victim.
As to the group benefited by the quota, it is often said with
some justification that the quota stigmatizes. It implies that members
of the favored group cannot make it on their own and are not to be
judged by the same rigorous standards that other individuals face.
The very existence of the quota, therefore, is a badge of inferiority.
The persons most harmed, of course, are those members of the group
that could have made it on their own, for they are forever subjected
to the false, but well-founded, suspicion that they did not do so.
45. Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
46. Id. at 289.
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This kind of harm exists irrespective of whether there was a
"flexible goal" or a "rigid quota." The fact that selections are not
made on a race- and sex-blind basis in either case means that the
stigma is present. Whether it was a thumb on the scale or a fist, the
badge of inferiority that comes with preferential treatment will always
be present. 47
From the perspective of the direct victim of the quota - typically
a white man - the distinction between "preferences" and "goals"
and "quotas" seems utterly irrelevant. He did not get the job because
of his sex and/or race; another candidate got the job because of his
or her sex and/or race. This man derives no comfort from knowing
that he was not the victim of a "rigid quota" but rather of a "flexible
goal." Whether the successful candidate was slightly less qualified,
only marginally qualified, or even unqualified, the harm to the re-
jected victim is the same. Indeed, the economic injury he suffers is
no different from that suffered by a black or a woman who has been
discriminated against.
Some people express support for preferences when race or sex is
just "one of many" factors as opposed to being the "sole factor,"
but this also is a distinction without a difference. President Clinton
thus objected to rejection or selection "solely on the basis of race or
gender" and Assistant Attorney General Patrick supported use or sex
when it is "a factor, but is not necessarily dispositive." However,
whenever a preference is granted, race or sex is dispositive and the
decision itself is in reality based solely on race or sex. The employer
in Johnson, for example, would have selected Johnson on the merits,
but solely because of sex, it selected a woman instead. Sex was the
"dispositive factor"; the only reason that Johnson did not get the
promotion was that he was a man.
Some people simply deny the existence of these victims of affir-
mative action. That was the thrust of the Blumrosen report, but, of
course, that report went only to the existence of victims of illegal
affirmative action. In some sense, of course, all affirmative action,
even the most benign, can harm the nonbeneficiaries. If the employer
had not cast a wide net, A would have been hired, but because the
net was wider, B was in the pool and he was more qualified than A.
47. It is sometimes argued that other people have gotten various kinds of preferences
without any badge of inferiority being associated with it. An example that is sometimes given
is nepotism, the practice of favoring kin for positions. One should not blithely assume that
there is no associated badge of inferiority. One of the frequently recurring figures in books
and movies is the son, or perhaps more commonly the nephew, of the business owner who
lacked qualifications for the job but obtained a position of authority because of his relationship.
This person is generally portrayed as a figure of ridicule.
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Therefore, when the employer relied on merit in selecting from the
wider pool, B got the job and A did not. Although such a decision
would be "because" of affirmative action in some sense, few people
are troubled by this kind of process. After all, A and B were competing
on equal terms, and B was more qualified than A.
Preferences are a different matter. If A and B are in the pool
together, and A is more qualified (whether because of educational
qualifications, prior experience, job performance, seniority, etc.) yet
B is hired or promoted because of race, A is quite clearly a victim
of a racial preference. Most hiring and promotion decisions are zero-
sum; you cannot provide the job to B without at the same time
denying it to A. A is harmed; A is a victim of racial preferences. To
say that this kind of intentional harm is permissible because the
underlying motivation is not to harm A but to help B makes little
more sense than it would to mitigate the wrong of the crazed tennis
fan who attacked Monica Seles on the ground that he was motivated
not by a desire to harm Ms. Seles but rather by a desire to help Steffi
Graf.48
Preferences are not victimless phenomena. Paul Johnson was
harmed by the sex preference: he did not get his promotion. Brian
Weber was harmed by the racial preference: he did not get admitted
into the training program. Sharon Taxman was harmed by the racial
preference: she got laid off instead of having the opportunity to have
the layoff decision be determined by chance; actuarially, she lost only
half a job, but she lost nonetheless.49 Johnson, Weber, and Taxman
are all flesh-and-blood victims.
VI. THE EFFECT OF ADARAND ON THE EXECUTIVE ORDER PROGRAM
In addition to considering the wisdom of affirmative-action pol-
icy, this Committee is also considering the effect that the Adarand
case had on the constitutionality of OFCCP enforcement activities.
Because of the surreptitious nature of the preferences involved, there
is no easy answer to that question.
In Adarand, the Supreme Court reviewed the federal govern-
ment's practice of presuming that subcontractors who are "Black
48. See Ferdinand Protzman, Seles, No. 1 Tennis Player, Is Stabbed During a Match,
N.Y. TmEs, May 1, 1993, §1, at 1.
49. As the Supreme Court observed in Northeastern Fla. Contractors v. Jacksonville,
508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993), "the 'injury in fact' in an equal protection case . . .is the denial of
equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain
the benefit."
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Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific
Americans, and other minorities" are "socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals." Because prime contractors received ad-
ditional compensation if they used subcontractors certified as small
businesses controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals," the effect of the presumption was to make it harder for
non-minority subcontractors to bid successfully. The subcontractor in
Adarand had submitted the low bid on a guardrail project but lost
the contract to a minority business that had benefited from the
presumption of disadvantage.
The Supreme Court held that even though the racial classification
may have been "benign" - in the sense that it was motivated by a
desire to assist minorities rather than to oppress them - it would
comply with the Fifth Amendment's equal-protection principle only
if it satisfied the "strict scrutiny" standard. Under that standard,
both the means and the ends of the classification are examined: "such
classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored
measures that further compelling government interests." The Court
did not apply the strict-scrutiny standard to the program at issue in
Adarand, instead directing the lower courts to do so.
Predicting how the Court would apply Adarand to the OFCCP
enforcement scheme is difficult, because of the somewhat indirect
way that the OFCCP requires preferences. However, if the Court
were willing to look beyond form to substance, there seems little
doubt that the contracting regulations would be held unconstitutional.
Assume, for sake of discussion, that the program were formally
structured to require directly what it now requires indirectly. Suppose
the OFCCP regulations explicitly informed employers that: (1) they
must adopt affirmative action plans that contain "goals" for women
and minorities; (2) if necessary to satisfy these goals, employers must
give preference to women and minorities; and (3) if employers fail to
satisfy their goals, they will face governmental sanctions.
Would such a scheme satisfy the strict-scrutiny standard? Is it
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest? The
only compelling governmental interest that the Court has identified
for "benign" racial discrimination in employment is the remedying
of prior intentional discrimination. 0 The Court has rejected such
justifications as "societal discrimination," "role models," and "out-
right racial balancing." If the government's purpose is merely to
50. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (19871: Wygant v- Jackson Rd. of FAd.!!fu
476 U.S. 267 (1986). See also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989);
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2097.
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increase the number of women and minorities in particular jobs, that
would seem equivalent to the University of California at Davis' desire
to have more black medical students or doctors, an interest that
Justice Powell described in Bakke as "facially invalid . . . discrimi-
nation for its own sake." ' 5'
It seems clear that the OFCCP program cannot be justified as a
response to past discrimination. Affirmative action goals are imposed
on all federal contractors, not just those for whom evidence of prior
discrimination exists. A demonstration that there has been prior
discrimination against women and minorities in the labor market as
a whole is insufficient to justify nationwide preferences for all federal
contractors.5 2 As the Supreme Court observed in Croson, "a gener-
alized assertion that there has been past discrimination in an entire
industry provides no guidance for a legislative body to determine the
precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy." 53 As now-Solicitor
General Drew Days wrote in a 1987 law review article, "it is essential
that state and local agencies also establish the presence of discrimi-
nation in their own bailiwicks, based either upon their own fact-
finding processes or upon determinations made by other competent
institutions." 5 4 The critical question in Croson was whether there had
been discrimination in contracting in the City of Richmond, and the
Court rejected the notion that findings of discrimination could be
"shared" from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.55 Because there is not even
an attempt to discover whether an individual federal contractor (or
like businesses operating in the same market) has ever engaged in
discrimination, no plausible argument can be made that the prefer-
ences under the Executive Order are justified as a response to dis-
crimination.56
51. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, at 307 (opinion of Justice Powell).
52. See Memorandum from Walter Dillinger, Assistant Attorney General of the United
States, to General Counsels (June 28, 1995), reprinted in Justice Department Memorandum on
Supreme Court's Adarand Decision, DAmLY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 125 (June 29, 1995), available
in LEXIS, Labor Library, DLABRT file, Doc. No. 1995 DLR 125 d33 ("Given the nation's
history of discrimination, virtually all affirmative action can be considered remedial in the
broad sense. But as Croson makes plain, that history, on its own, cannot properly form the
basis of a remedial affirmative action measure under strict scrutiny.").
53. 488 U.S. at 498.
54. See Drew Days, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453, 480-81 (1987).
55. 488 U.S. at 505.
56. The Croson Court also found that extension of the benefits of its set-aside program
to Hispanics, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts called into question the City's justification
of the program as a remedy for historical discrimination against blacks. The Executive Order
takes an equally broad-brushed approach in identifying the beneficiaries of the program,
extending both to women and an extremely broad array of "minorities." See 41 C.F.R. § 60-
4.3(a)(l)(d) (1995):
'Minority' includes: (i) Black (all persons having origins in any of the Black African
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Many proponents of preferences cite the interest in having a
"diverse" work force. However, Justice O'Connor's opinion in Cro-
son seems to suggest that such forward- looking justifications are
impermissible and that affirmative action must be "strictly reserved
for the remedial setting." 5 7 Other Justices, most consistently Justice
Stevens, have argued that nonremedial interests, such as "diversity,"
may justify some affirmative action programs." However, as the
Justice Department memorandum on affirmative action states, "it is
clear that to the extent affirmative action is used to foster racial and
ethnic diversity, the government must seek some further objective,
beyond the mere achievement of diversity itself."5 9 Whatever argument
for diversity that might be made for teachers, students, and police
officers is unlikely to extend as well to plumbers and accountants.
Moreover, it is far from clear that the government's interest in
ensuring the diversity of each private employer's work force is of as
great a magnitude as its interest in ensuring the diversity of its own
work force.
Because there is no plausible compelling interest supporting across-
the-board OFCCP-mandated preferences, it is not necessary, or even
sensible, to address the question of narrow tailoring. As the Supreme
Court observed in Croson, "it is almost impossible to assess whether
the Richmond Plan is narrowly tailored to remedy prior discrimination
since it is not linked to identified discrimination in any way." How-
ever, the Court did make two observations concerning the Richmond
plan that are equally applicable to the federal-contractor program.
First, the Court noted that there seemed to have been no consideration
of the use of race-neutral means to increase minority participation,
and second, the percentage goal rested "upon the 'completely un-
realistic' assumption that minorities will choose a particular trade in
lockstep proportion to their representation in the local population."60
In sum, an explicit Federal program requiring contractors to
engage in preferential hiring would not satisfy the dictates of Adarand
racial groups not of Hispanic origin); (ii) Hispanic (all persons of Mexican, Puerto
Rican, Cuban, Central or South American or other Spanish Culture or origin,
regardless of race); (iii) Asian and Pacific Islander (all persons having origins in any
of the original peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, the Indian Subcontinent, or
the Pacific Islands); and (iv) American Indian or Alaskan Native (all persons having
origins in any of the original peoples of North America and maintaining identifiable
tribal affiliations through membership and participation or community identification).
It is hard to understand what "wrong" justifies a remedy for a recent immigrant from
Bangladesh, for example, or why such an immigrant would have a greater claim than an
immigrant from Afghanistan.
57. 488 U.S. at 493.
58. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 314 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
59. See Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, supra note 52.
60. 488 U.S. at 507.
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and Croson. The remaining question is whether a program is saved
from unconstitutionality by its indirect and covert nature.
As described previously, there is a formal distinction between
goals and preferences, but in practice goals lead inexorably to pre-
ferences. The OFCCP takes the position that if federal contractors
are employing preferences in an attempt to satisfy their compliance
obligations, they are going beyond anything that the government
requires. As a result, it would argue, the "private" actions of the
contractors are not subject to constitutional scrutiny.
It is difficult to predict how the Supreme Court would apply its
constitutional decisions to the Executive Order program. Wholly vol-
untary preferences by private employers would raise no constitutional
issue, so the question is whether the Court would look beyond form
to substance. There is certainly support in Supreme Court case law
for the proposition that federal pressure to engage in preferences is
subject to constitutional limitation even if the pressure stops short of
strict compulsion. As the Court observed in Norwood v. Harrison, a
case involving the constitutionality of a state's provision of textbooks
to racially discriminatory private schools, "lilt is . . .axiomatic that
a state may not induce, encourage or promote private persons to
accomplish what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish." '6'
The uncertainty of the Supreme Court's approach to the OFCCP
program makes congressional action all the more imperative. Congress
may act based upon its judgment concerning the wisdom of the policy;
it need not confine its inquiry to the policy's constitutionality. For
some reason, much of the rhetoric surrounding these issues starts
from the assumption that if a particular program is constitutional,
then it is "good" and should survive. However, that inverts the
proper analysis. The proper analysis is to decide whether a policy is
wise and then to ask whether there are constitutional barriers to its
implementation. Whether or not the OFCCP enforcement regime is
constitutional, it is not good policy. Thus, no prognostications con-
cerning the applicability of Adarand are necessary antecedents to
passage of H.R. 2128.
VII. POSSIBLE MODIFICATION OF THE MISSION OF THE OFCCP
This Committee is also considering whether some modification
of the mission of the OFCCP might be in order. Certainly, as
61. 413" U.S. 455, 465 (1973) (quoting Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp.
458, 475-76 (M.D. Ala. 1967)).
19961 1155
OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 22
described above, the OFCCP should get out of the business of
requiring preferences. However, the problem with the OFCCP goes
beyond that. The OFCCP has transformed itself into a full-fledged
anti-discrimination enforcement agency, largely duplicating the func-
tions of the EEOC without the built-in safeguards against arbitrary
agency action that Title VII provides.
When the OFCCP conducts compliance reviews, it focuses on
employers whose "numbers" are not right and often conducts ex-
haustive (and exhausting) reviews of the employers' hiring and pro-
motion activities looking for "discrimination." Compliance officers
second-guess the employers' employment decisions, and when they
decide that in their opinion an unsuccessful woman or minority should
have been hired, the agency will often order the employer to provide
a remedy. The agency is thus both prosecutor and judge. The fact
that the EEOC may have already found "no cause" in the case does
not prevent the OFCCP from insisting on a remedy. 62 One can easily
understand the unfairness to employers that follows from the fact
that when the agency seeks to demonstrate how important it is, it
touts the volume of settlements that it has obtained from contractors. 6
It therefore has a tremendous incentive to label employers "discrim-
inators"; if it finds no discrimination, it is not "doing its job."
In an era of "reinventing" and streamlining government, it makes
little sense for the OFCCP to be duplicating the function of the
EEOC. It is the EEOC that was charged with enforcing Title VII. In
fact, Congress declined to give the EEOC the kind of enforcement
authority that the OFCCP has taken upon itself.
62. The OFCCP is about to begin a compliance review of the Los Alamos National
Laboratory to investigate allegations of race discrimination in layoffs. See Keith Easthouse,
U.S. Labor Department Will Probe Layoffs, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Feb. 10, 1996, at BI.
A number of Hispanic employees had alleged that a major layoff of employees was intentionally
racially discriminatory because the Laboratory targeted its nonscientific support staff (who are
disproportionately minority) for layoff rather than its overwhelmingly Anglo male scientific
staff. On its face, that is an improbable claim, since it would mean that the Laboratory either
would have preferred to lay scientific staff off or would have been indifferent to whether
scientific staff or support staff were laid off, except for the fact that support staff were
disproportionately minority. Given that in a scientific lab the scientific staff are the "producers"
and the nonscientific support staff are the "overhead," there is nothing suspicious on its face
in the Laboratory's choice. Indeed, claims of racial discrimination had earlier been dropped
for lack of evidence from a lawsuit by laid-off employees. See Keith Easthouse, Racial Issues
Dropped from Suit Against Lab, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Nov. 7, 1995, at B2. This case
appears to demonstrate two points: (1) that employers should ensure that there is proportional
representation in their employment decisions if they want to avoid trouble from the OFCCP;
and (2) that the OFCCP expends a great deal of effort in,, that could be, and should
be, performed by the EEOC.
63. See supra note 26.
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This is not to say that there is no legitimate function for the
OFCCP. The outreach activities that the OFCCP says are the heart
of its affirmative-action concerns are not required by Title VII, and
the EEOC therefore ordinarily has no jurisdiction over a claim that
an employer did not "cast the net widely enough." The OFCCP
could provide its expertise to employers to assist them in seeking to
enhance the diversity of its applicant pool.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The notion that one can have a merit-based system that is sex-
and race-conscious is an illusion. Goals and timetables (or other
numerical objectives) create an inexorable pressure to engage in pre-
ferences. The decision-maker can make decisions based upon the goals
or upon race- and sex-neutral criteria; it simply cannot do both. H.R.
2128 is a sensible step toward a system of race- and sex-neutral
decision-making.
The question whether Adarand does or does not invalidate the
Executive Order program is a diversion that need not impede legis-
lative attempts to prevent the Federal Government from requiring
that its contractors employ preferences. Indeed, a conclusion that
Adarand would spare the program makes congressional action all the
more necessary, since if it is unconstitutional the courts will eventually
invalidate it.
Once the OFCCP is out of the business of enforcing a system
that effectively mandates preferences, the question is whether it has
any remaining proper function. Although its activities as an anti-
discrimination agency largely overlap with the jurisdiction of the
EEOC, and for that reason should be eliminated, the OFCCP may
still perform a useful function in assisting federal contractors in their
outreach activities.
If the ideal is to move toward a system in which individuals are
judged according to their own distinctive qualities, it is time to move
beyond the currently preference- ridden system. Some believe that
Justice Blackmun's statement in Bakke that "[Jiln order to get beyond
racism, we must first take account of race" and that "in order to
treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently" is pro-
found. Their belief is only half right; Justice Blackmun's statement
is profoundly wrong. H.R. 2128 is an important step toward recog-
nition of that fact.
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